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THE REGIME OF STRAITS AND NATIONAL SECURITY:
AN APPRAISAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING
By W. Michael Reisman *
The United States military potential may be viewed in two interlocking
dimensions. The first is nuclear deterrence: the maintenance of a posture
designed to deter other states with nuclear military potential from nuclear
adventures. The second is comprised of nuclear and more conventional
capabilities, designed to communicate to the widest spectrum of adver-
saries a capacity and willingness to exercise coercion in different settings
in order to protect vital national interests.
The importance of the oceans to the use of the military instrument is
obvious: the oceans, their airspace, and submerged areas are some five-
sevenths of the world arena. Both of the dimensions of military potential
currently include use of the oceans, their airspace, and, in particular, their
straits; both require an international normative regime which facilitates
that use.' Possible future uses, particularly with regard to superjacent
airspace, must also be considered in determining what constitutes a mini-
mally acceptable normative regime. It is clear, for example, that greater
use of airspace for military and commercial purposes and the routinization
of shuttles with satellites may make the airspace over these five-sevenths
of the globe even more critical.2
In many ways, U.S. national interests in these dimensions of the mari-
time regime resonate positively with the common interests of the world
in a system of minimum order. An effective system of mutual deterrence
between the superpowers is not only in their own interests; it is a pre-
requisite to general survival. In any community, common interests must
* Of the Board of Editors.
Parts of this essay draw on work in progress on the international prescriptive func-
tion, supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation. The author
gratefully acknowledges the comments and criticisms of Myres S. McDougal, John
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'Regarding the impacts of norms on naval activity, see Knight, The Law of the Sea
and Naval Missions, 103 U.S. NAVAL INsTrruTE PROCEEDINGS 34 (1977); Osgood, U.S.
Security Interests in Ocean Law, in A. HoLLIcK & R. OsGooD, NEv ERA OF OCEAN
PoLmcs 75 (1974); Hill, U.S. Law of the Sea Position and its Effect on the Operating
Navy: A Naval Officer's View, 3 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 341 (1976). For a more
extreme view, see O'Connell's remarks in BurrAIN AND THE SEA (Papers and Records
of a Conference at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, September 12-14, 1973);
O'Connell, International Law and Contemporary Naval Operations, 44 BrT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 19 (1970).
2 Some perspectives are offered in Pickett, Airlift and Military Intervention, in THE
LmIITs OF M rLIARY INTERVENTION 137 (Stem ed. 1977).
HeinOnline -- 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 48 1980
THE REGIME OF STRAITS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
predominate; this has been an enduring postulate of international maritime
law. "Navigation and shipping," Ambassador Pardo has said, ". . . are
fields where because of the requirements of international trade and inter-
course ... the international interest ... must prevail."3  Deterrence is an
uncompromisable security necessity for all members of the world com-
munity. Where national claims are inconsistent with the regime that pro-
vides effective deterrence, they must yield to the inclusive interest, for
minimum order is inescapably the preeminent common interest.4
The United States system of deterrence 5 is based on a nuclear triad:
warheads delivered by land-based ballistic missiles, by aircraft, and by
ballistic missiles carried by submarines (SLBM's).6 Prelaunch location,
3 Statement delivered before the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond Limits of National Jurisdiction on March 23, 1971, quoted
in Lapidoth, Freedom of Navigation-Its Legal History and its Normative Basis, 6
J. MAR. L. & CoM. 259-72 (1975). Where goals are stated in functional terms, it is
important to test the institutional arrangements for their realization functionally, for
in conventional terms, there may appear to be inequalities. Functional goals may be
fulfilled when one state exercises virtual plenary jurisdiction in waters within 12 miles
of its coast, while another, whose coasts front on a strait, may enjoy considerably less
jurisdiction. The test here is not formal equality but whether the goal is approximated.
41 do not minimize the substantial interests of coastal states in establishing regimes
to deal effectively with the increasingly intensive and potentially noxious uses of their
coastal waters. Young writes, "No underinsured, ill-equipped, ill-navigated, chartless,
flag-of-convenience-registered 250,000 ton tanker can ever be 'innocent' in the English
Channel or the Malacca Strait, or, should it find itself there, in the Canadian Arctic."
Young, New Laws for Old Navies: Military Implications. of the Law of the Sea, 16
SURVIVAL 262, 265 (1974). Obviously, an acceptable regime must protect those inter-
ests, but unless it is compatible with minimum order requirements, no interests will sur-
vive. In many circumstances, it should be plain that coastal interests may be enhanced
by not enlarging coastal competence: see note 48 infra. In other circumstances, organi-
zational and normative design may accommodate freedom of navigation and coastal
interest, e.g., in absolute liability standards, insurance schemes, and punitive damages.
See, e~g., the statement of John R. Stevenson before Subcommittee II of the Seabed
Committee, July 28, 1972, UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.37, at 2 (1972), cited in
Knight, Issues before the Third UN Conference, 34 LA. L. REV. 155, 184 (1974).
For an earlier discussion, see E. Lauterpacht, Freedom of Transit in International Law,
44 GnorIUs SocETY TRANSACTIONS 313, esp. 319-20 (1958-59).
5 For general background, see P. GREEN, DEADLY LOGIC: THE THEORY OF NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE (1966); R. JoNEs, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: A SHORT POLITICAL ANAL-
YSIS (1968); H. KAHN, TIKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE (1962); A. LEGAULT,
THE DYNAMICS OF THE NUCLEAR BALANCE (1974); S. MAXWELL, RATIONALITY IN
DETERRENCE (1968); P. MORGAN, DETERRENCE: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS (1977);
R. ROSECRANCE, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE RECONSIDERED (1975); A. GEORGE & R. SMoKE,
DETERRENCE IN ANERicAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1974). For
historical and comparative perspectives, see R. NAROLL, MILITARY DETERRENCE IN
HISTORY: A Paor CnOss-HISTORICAL SURvEY (1974).
6 On submarine warfare, see Rathjens & Ruina, Trident, in THE FUTURE OF THE SEA-
BASED DETERREIN-r 66 (Tsipis, Cahn, & Feld, eds., 1973); Hill, Maritime Power and
the Law of the Sea, 17 SURVIVAL 70 (1975); Garwin, Antisubmarine Warfare and
National Security, in PRoGREss IN ARMIs CONTROL? READINGS FROM SCIENTIFIC AMER-
iCAN 82-94 (Russett & Blair, eds. 1979), and see the editors' Introduction, id. at 30-
31; R. H. Smith, ASW-The Crucial Naval Challenge, 98 U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PRO-
CEEDINGS 126-41 (1972); Scoville, Missile Submarines! and National Security, 226
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storage, relative mobility, method of delivery, targeting accuracy, and
vulnerability introduce significantly different strategic, deterrent, and po-
litical factors for each.
Land-based missiles, from fixed bases and, to a lesser degree, from air-
craft, exercise an inherent attraction for preemption or first strike, whereas
submarine missiles, by virtue of their mobility and comparative invisibility,
do not. Many students of this area believe that for the foreseeable future
antisubmarine warfare techniques pose no serious threat to U.S. sub-
marines-assuming the subs are submerged. The differences between land
basing and submarine delivering are more than marginal. A former Secre-
tary of State contends that "by some time in the early 1980s the Soviet
Union will have the capability to destroy with a reasonable degree of con-
fidence most of our land-based ICBMs. In the same period of time we
will not be able to destroy the Soviet ICBM force." 7 Even if this prog-
nosis proves wrong, other significant factors must be taken into account.
For one, submarine missiles are more stable politically. Precisely because
land-based missiles exercise a preemption and first-strike attraction for
adversaries, democratic allies hosting them will be vulnerable to domestic
political pressure for their removal. The more democratic a host becomes,
the more it becomes susceptible to domestic pressure to exp el the very
missiles protecting the alliance; national defense planners encounter this
phenomenon in domestic politics about siting land-based missiles. Even
where the foreign host is undemocratic, land-based missiles may make it
subject to extraordinary political pressures or blandishments by the adver-
sary. Without addressing relative military utility, it seems clear, for these
and other reasons, that submarine missiles offer a more reliable deterrent."
SciErTIFic Am. 18 (1972), reprinted in Russett & Blair eds., this note supra; Polar
& Paolucci, Sea-Based "Strategic" Weapons for the 1980's and Beyond, 104/5 U.S.
NAvAL INSTITuTE PROCEEDINGS 98 (1978); Hoist, The Navies of the Superpowers:
Motives, Forces, Prospects, in PowLR AT SEA, II: SupEaowxas AND NAVIES 4 (Adelphi
Papers No. 123, 1976). For a more popular presentation, see Stanford, The Deadly
'Move to Sea,' N.Y. Times Magazine, September 21, 1975.
7 Kissinger's Critique, THE ECONOMIST (London), February 3, 1979, at 17, 18. The
development was anticipated almost 20 years ago by Dr. Oskar Morgenstern:
The United States can make its force invulnerable by hardening. . . . But this
has the simple consequence that. these sites will come under correspondingly
heavier attack. Their locations in the United States ... are perfectly known to
the enemy. With modem missile technology it is easy to nullify any degree of
hardening by the dispatch of more missiles with more and more powerful nuclear
warheads. Hardened bases draw heavier fire, mostly ground bursts producing
deadly fall-out that spreads throughout the continent....
Morgenstern, Effective and Secure Deterrence, The Oceanic System, 11960] RCAF
STAFF C.J., reprinted in Polmar & Paolucci, supra note 6, at 107.
s The major vulnerability of airpower is that it must get off the ground. Land-
based missiles may become unacceptably vulnerable in the next decade rs the USSR's
throw-weight increases. To counter this development, defense specialists seek to in-
crease the number of launch points, which, ih turn, incites public resistance in the
neighborhoods where siting is projected. SLBM's do not present these problems;
moreover, they often traverse shorter distances, making them more effective and
advantageous.
Vol. 74
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Terms such as "gunboat diplomacy" and "showing the flag" are rather
anachronistic ways of expressing the fact that an integral part of political
power at any level of social organization is the general expectation that
an actor has the capacity and will to use force to conserve or extend vital
interests. Stability is increased when capacity, will, and vital interest are
correctly appraised by others; it is decreased when they are misperceived.
This process proceeds even when troops rest in their barracks and ships
bunker at home ports, for it is an ongoing assessment of possibility. As
Lasswell put it:
Demands for colonies, ships, and treaty revisions are continually modi-
fied in the light of estimated changes in the relative fighting position
of groups; estimates of fighting effectiveness are differentially modi-
fied by actual changes in the natural resources and technology; and
identifications with this or that collective symbol are partially con-
trolled by the supposed prospects of success of that symbol in the
struggle for status."
One of the key and often misunderstood functions of the military instru-
ment is not during war, but before war, and hopefully in preventing war.
The military instrument is an unwelcome and yet ubiquitous feature of
politics at all times and its relative utility at any particular time depends
on comparative quanta as well as locations."" Hence the continuing im-
Thus, Morgenstern, with extraordinary prescience, argued:
Indeed, we must go further and place the major part of the retaliatory force
outside our country . . .on the vast expanses of the world's oceans, in fact under
the waters. We then combine through the use of nuclear-powered, missile-firing
Polaris submarines the tremendous advantages of mobility with invisibility; and
we can distribute individual units randomly, thereby makng surprise attack on
any even remotely substantial part of that force impossible. I call this the Oceanic
System of Defense.
Morgenstern, supra note 7, at 107.
9 H. LASSWELL, WoaLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSEcuvrrY 40 (1935; Free Press
Paperback, 1965). See also E. LurrwAx, Tsm POLITICAL USES OF SEAPOWER 1-38
(1974). Young, supra note 4, argues at 266 that "probably no naval vessel can now
count on being freely allowed passage through straits in time of trouble, whatever
the small print of the relevant convention might say." The comparative certainty of
that statement will be affected by the normative regime that results; the latter will
certainly influence the degree of freedom of passage in noncrisis periods, when the
military instrument continues to be important.
loSee generally, E. LurrwAx, note 9 supra; McGwire, Changing Naval Operations
and Military Intervention, in Stern ed., supra note 2, at 151; Feld, Military Demon-
strations: Intervention and the Flag, id. at 197; J. CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLo.Nfrcy (1971).
In this respect, Pirtle's comments would appear to miss the point. Obviously, the
depth and breadth of straits make them susceptible to blockage or mining during in-
tense belligerency: Patterson, Mining: A Naval Strategy, 23 NAVAL WAi C. REV. 52
(1971). This vulnerability must be factored into calculations by all parties vho may
even discover a common interest in keeping the straits open in those periods. But a
key concern of an appropriate maritime regime is to keep the straits maximally open
in non- and prebelligerent situations: Pirtle, Transit Rights and U.S. Security Interests
in International Straits: The "Straits Debate" Revisited, 5 OcEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J.
492 (1978). In his emphasis on power alone, Pirtle, like Young (note 9 supra),
would appear to misunderstand the general function of law in the power arena.
19801
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portance of communicating strategic and tactical capabilities. In the
contemporary arena, strategic and tactical capabilities employ submarine
as well as surface and aerial elements, all of which may require relatively
easy access to large parts of the oceans and, in particular, transit through
straits. Indeed, the expectation of accessibility is, itself, a key component
of the military effectiveness of the weapons system."'
In a deterrence system, the normative regime must fulfill these require-
ments for all parties and must not be run aground to serve 'he apparent
short-term advantages of one party in the ceaseless zigs and zags of com-
petitive technological and weapons development. Thus, the fact that the
USSR may benefit from making the United States "straits-bound" with
regard to submerged or surface passage in a particular part of the world
or that the United States may benefit from having the USSR "straits-
bound" in the interim when the range and accuracy of U.S. SLBM's do not
require the proximity afforded by straits passage, does not, in terms of
long-range interests, justify either in establishing a regime which dimin-
ishes the deterrent capacities of the other. In the logic of a deterrence
system, each party must remain assured of its deterrent competence; as
assurance erodes, the inclination to preempt increases.
Among other things, the effectiveness of both the SLBM component of
the deterrence system and the surface and aerial components of the stra-
tegic and tactical system requires unrestricted access to large parts of the
oceans. In the case of SLBM submarines, access must include the right to
remain submerged in order to avoid detection, a consideration at best only
partially satisfied by the increasing range and accuracy of SLBM's. As
a recent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute study puts it:
Unlike torpedo or cruise missile-carrying counter-shipping subma-
rines, the ballistic missile submarine has a strategic rather than a tac-
tical role. Its operations are therefore not confined to the vicinity
of a convoy or a task force; rather it roams submerged in the millions
of cubic kilometres of ocean from where it can be within range of
its strategic inland targets. It does not seek to approach but rather
avoids, surface ships, since its main operational requirement is to
remain undetected and thereby ensure the availability of its ballistic
missiles at any instant.
2
In deterrence theory, detection of the submarine is as systemically danger-
ous as would be an antiballistic missile system to protect citiE.s:
The deployment of ABM (anti-ballistic missile) systems to protect
urban areas was prohibited by the SALT I agreements, the reason
being that such systems impede the ability of ballistic missiles to
attack urban areas and hence erode the counter-value role of these
missiles. Similarly, an ASW [antisubmarine warfare] system de-
signed to attack missile-carrying submarines could threaten the sec-
"For an excellent discussion, see F. KRUGER-SPRENGEL, THE ROLE OF NATO IN THE
UsE OF THE SEA AND THE SEABED (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Ocean Ser. No. 304, 1972).
12 "Antisubmarine Warfare," WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT, SIPRI Y.B.
1974, at 303, 304.
[Vol. 74
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ond-strike capability of these submarines, and would thus be as un-
desirable as an urban ABM system: both ABM and ASW systems
undermine the credibility of deterrence as a viable strategic posture.
The institutionalization of deterrence as the mutual strategic posture
of the Soviet Union and the United States (and presumably also
France, Britain and China) appears to proscribe any military opera-
tion that could threaten the stability of strategic weapon systems on
which the credibility of deterrence is based?.
3
An acceptable public order of the oceans as it pertains to security should
provide for wide surface and aerial access and rights of submerged passage
as unconditionally as possible.14
13 Id. at 304. These conclusions will not be accepted by American or Soviet strate-
gists who view strategic forces as being not only deterrent, but also as war fighting;
the), will obviously desire to threaten the second-strike capabilities of the adversary, a
sequence with which this article will not deal.
14 Professor Burke has argued that "[tihere appears to be a very insubstantial basis
for concluding that the security position of the powers employing nuclear or other
submarines would be materially prejudiced by requiring these craft to travel on the
surface through straits or other parts of the territorial sea." W. BURuKE, CONTEMPORARY
LAw OF THE SEA: TRANSPORTATION, COMIUNICATION AN) FLIGHT 12 (Law of the
Sea Institute Occasional Paper No. 28, Univ. of R.I., 1975). Burke implies in a foot-
note that the development of underwater surveillance systems makes undetected pas-
sage through straits improbable: if this is the case, there is cogency to his argument.
But the works he cites to support his contention are at best ambivalent on this point
and at worst directly contrary to it. After a discussion of all the surveillance systems
designed to locate submarines, one of the cited works observes:
Acoustic countermeasures designed to confuse the sonar devices of an opponent
seem to offer considerable opportunity for effective innovation. Torpedoes carry-
ing recorded submarine sounds, which are now employed to test and practice the
use of acoustic homing torpedoes, can be easily modified to spoof the sounds of
a submarine in order to confuse even the most sophisticated passive sonar. lam-
ming of the large passive arrays with noise makers is relatively easy since, unlike
the case of electromagnetic radiation, the relevant frequency band is rather lim-
ited and can be easily covered. Other counter-ASW measures include the reduc-
tion of the acoustic cross-section of submarines by using smaller hulls made of
reinforced plastics and titanium, or using fuel cells (developed for space use)
that will replace the cumbersome and relatively noisy reactor with a much quieter
power crew; such power plants can give future hunter-killer submarines the speed
and depth characteristics of the considerably larger and noisier nuclear-power
craft.
SIPRI, TAcricAL AND STRATEGIC ANTI-SUBMA R NE WARFARE 31 (1974).
But the piece continues, "In several countries work is going on to develop torpedo-
countermeasure resistance (counter-countermeasures) and achieve sonar improvements
that aim at neutralizing acoustic countermeasure efforts." Once perfected, if not
sooner, such efforts will probably result in still another round of countermeasures. To
the same effect Pirtle contends that the operationalization of the Trident system, with
its increased range and accuracy, will minimize the importance of straits passage for
submarines. Pirtle, supra note 10, at 488. Like Burke, Pirtle does not address some
of the considerations raised in the cited SIPRI studies. Neither considers that the
common interests in the global deterrence system may require that both the United
States and the USSR enjoy plenary navigation rights through straits.
Nor should changes in technology alone be invoked to devaluate straits for U.S.
security. Adversaries may have or may acquire means for detecting submerged passage
of U.S. vessels through straits, but that does not terminate the utility of a right of sub-
merged passage. There are many actors who will not have that means of detection,
and secrecy of passage may still have strategic value with regard to interactions with
them.
1980]
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In the nature of things, normative regimes indulge some and deprive
others and hence are always under stress. Particular components are
always undergoing long-term erosion or reinforcement. But at about the
time that the sea-based deterrent became increasingly refined and began
to loom as one of the major bases of national security, the international
legal regime of the oceans supplied many of the user access requirements
through four venerable though not equally stable principles: (1) a com-
plex of user rights traditionally referred to as the freedom of navigation
on the high seas; (2) a 3-mile territorial sea, which left most of the oceans
as high seas and among other things resulted in (3) a belt of international
waters in most of the critical geographical straits of the world; (4) a right
of innocent passage in the territorial sea which, as we shall see, was rela-
tively broad in terms of the user and narrow in terms of the discretion
afforded to the coastal state to characterize passage as noninnocent.
It was the concatenation of these legal principles that made the sea-
based components of the security system possible. The U.S. interest in
the maintenance of this concatenation was expressed, with few exceptions,
and sometimes despite the U.S. delegation, in the products of the 1958
Law of the Sea Conference.' 5 The pertinent conventions emerging from
that conference took account of those interests and, in many though not
all key sectors succeeded in preserving the legal environment indispensable
for the deterrence system. Ironically, these norms were prescribed when
the United States was so strong that the norms themselves may not have
been exigent; nuclear predominance was so great that the abiding impor-
tance of the ocean and straits dimension may have been underestimated.
But as the constellation of political, military, technological, and resource
factors changes and U.S. power potentials vis-h-vis other actors at least
equalize, an appropriate normative system becomes more urgent.
The purpose of this article is to compare the concatenation of norms of
what may be called the 1958 system1 6 with the concatenation that is
emerging in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) 17 and to assess whether the newer regime as it pertains to
15 See generally Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was
Accomplished, 52 AJIL 607 (1958). See also Slonim, The Right of Innocent Passage
and the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 5 CoLUM. J. TRANsNAT'L L.
96 (1966). Oddly enough, the U.S. delegation espoused a number of positions actu-
ally contrary to its interests. For example, it supported a subjective conception of
innocent passage, and when it undertook its unsuccessful d6marche for a 6-mile ter-
ritorial sea, it did not insist on a straits exception. One can only sreculate as to
whether these were blunders or the result of an appraisal of the then political de-
pendency of key straits states.
16 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958), L5 UST 1606,
TIAS No. 5639, 516 UNTS 205 [hereinafter referred to as "Territorial Sea Conven-
tion" without additional citation]. Convention on the High Seas (19,58), 13 UST
2312, TIAS No. 5200, 420 UNTS 82 [hereinafter referred to as "High Seas Conven-
tion" without additional citation].
'1 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Revised Informal Com-
posite Negotiating Text for the Eighth Session, UN Doe. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1
(April 28, 1979), reprinted in 18 ILM 686 (1979). Research for this article was based
[ Vol. 74
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straits meets the requirements, in a new context, of both an international
deterrence system and a U.S. sea-based security system.' s Key questions
are whether the new regime provides as much mobility to submarines as
does the extant regime and whether it permits surface and aerial com-
ponents to be shifted as security interests require.
Given the importance of the SLBM component of the defense system, a
rather rigorous examination would appear called for. Since UNCLOS
will produce a complex convention, an essentially textual approach to
construction, as conceived by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
would appear required because of the Vienna Convention's directives,""
on the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) of 1977, but the provisions con-
cerned are cited from the more recent ICNT/Rev.1, where only minor changes were
made in them.
's This article does not address the related issues of the adequacy to security con-
cerns of the regimes for the exclusive economic zone and for archipelagos; some of the
problems treated here arise in those regimes as well. For example, Articles 56 to 58
transform certainties about many inclusive high seas rights into grave questions with
only the most general guidelines for decision (see, e.g., Article 59). Treatment of
these matters must await an additional article.
19 On the unfortunate predilection for textualism in international legal interpretation,
see, e.g., U.S. Nationals in Morocco case, [1952] ICJ REP. 196, 199, and, most recently,
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, [1978] ICJ REP. 20 f. The Vienna Convention's
codification in Articles 31 and 32 provides:
Article 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpreta-
tion of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended.
Article 32
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
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and ineluctable owing to the absence of a formal record of the travaux.20
The alternative hardly recommends itself. Travaux should be used to
supplement incomplete texts, but there is something inherently implausi-
ble, in a period immediately after a text's redaction, in using extraneous
material, even if it were not ambiguous and contradictory, against the
manifest purport of the text. It is even more curious to suggest that use
before the treaty has been accepted.
Given the very special political and legal problems dealt with here, it
would appear equally problematic to use certain practices, as evidence
of alleged custom, to illuminate the text. The Vienna Convention seems
to rule out prior practice for interpreting the text, permitting in Article
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/27,
reprinted in 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 8 ILM 679 (1969). On the issue of "special mean-
ings" of terms and burden of proof, see OFFICIAL RECORDS, UN CONFEnENCE ON THE
LAW OF TREATEs, Docuimrrs OF THE CONFmENCE 42, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/11/
Add.2 (1971). With regard to supplementary means of interpretation, note that Article
32 requires that the party seeking to adduce the supplement show that an interpreta-
tion without that material would be ambiguous, obscure, manifestly absurd, or un-
reasonable. That is a high threshold, indeed.
20 The records of UNCLOS summarize speeches on straits passage made on the record in
the 1974 Caracas and 1975 Geneva sessions. Key statements on straits passage may be
found in Volume 1 of the Of icial Records at pp. 59, 60, 63, 68, 71-72, 74, 75-76, 79,
80-81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 91, 92, 94, 96, 98, 99, 100-01, 104, 108, 110, 111, 113, 114-15,
116, 118, 119, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 135, 136, 137, 141, ]42, 144, 146,
148, 151, 152, 153, 155, 159, 160, 168, 169, 172, 178, 187. In Volume II of the
Official Records, key statements may be found at pp. 124-42.
It would be a misnomer to refer to these pages as evidence of a "dis..ussion"; they
appear, rather, as a series of prepared and read statements, with no interaction between
the speakers evident. To cite one example, at the 26th meeting of the Plenary on
July 2, 1974, Mongolia, Yugoslavia, Tanzania, Mauritania, and India spoke in succes-
sion. Mongolia called for free passage through all international straits. Yugoslavia
affirmed coastal jurisdiction "to effectively guarantee their security and to safeguard
their legitimate interests"; "commercial navigation" for "permissible and legitimate
purposes" should also be guaranteed. Tanzania then contended that the entire notion
of freedom of the seas was outmoded, and Mauritania followed by calling for innocent
passage through straits. The circle was closed by India which called for free passage.
1 OFFiCnal RECORDS 91-93 (1975).
Professor Burke, who has criticized commentators for construing the ICNT textually,
concedes that there are no adequate legislative histories, and the records of different
groups meeting in closed or secret meetings are not available. Burke, Submerged
Passage Through Straits: Interpretations of the Proposed Law of the Sea Treaty Text,
52 WASH. L. REv. 193, 202-03 (1977). The artful interpreter may, of course, pick
and choose and cut and trim speeches from the meetings, but it is really quite difficult
to see how this sort of record can help to illuminate a text. Off-the-record and secret
meetings, in which transcripts may have been made, might indicate the actual line
of consensus (if any), but the probative value of such records against the text and
against the official record is a matter of question. As yet there is no systematic study
of the theory and practice of the use of travaux in international interpretation. Thus,
both lex lata and the otiose but actually meager record of this draft impel the inter-
preter to the text. Even with adequate travaux, a construction contra legem rather
than praeter legem is most difficult to sustain, especially during periods shortly after
the text was accepted. For the special problems involved in construing statements in
interest by the United States and inferring acquiescence by others, see note 63 infra.
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31(3) (b) reference to "subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty." As for prior practice, it would be as difficult to construe sub-
merged passage through straits now less than 6 miles in width as genera-
tive of a customary right of submerged passage through straits in general
as it would be to construe such passage through territorial waters as gen-
erative of a right of submerged passage there. By its nature, submerged
passage is not the sort of practice that generates customary rights. The
notoriety and opportunity for protest by parties thereafter subordinated-
requisite components of formation of prescriptive rights-can hardly be
fulfilled when the strait state does not or cannot know of the passage or
lacks the means of stopping it. And even if such practices were deemed
to have generated customary rights in one strait, they could not eo ipso be
applied to all straits, nor would they be probative of features of surface
or aerial passage.
Both the Vienna Convention and the special features of this problem
thus impel us to textual construction.
I. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
One of the freedoms of the high seas mentioned in Article 2 of the 1958
Convention on the High Seas is "the freedom of navigation," 21 a term
comprehensive in intention including movement, observation, inspection,
maneuvers, tests, and so forth, carried out above, on, and below the sur-
face. The design of Article 2 is noteworthy. The freedoms or protected
uses of the high seas are to be exercised "with reasonable regard to the
interests of other states," but cannot be subjected to state sovereignty:
"no state may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sover-
eignty." The "freedoms" can be regulated only by the treaty or by inter-
national law: "Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions
laid down by these articles and by other rules of international law." Thus,
these freedoms may be deemed to be absolute in the sense that, absent a
treaty or other norm, improper use may give rise to protest or stronger
action on another plane, but will not permit an aggrieved state to interfere
with the allegedly abusive use on the same plane.
22
While the general freedom of navigation is potentially subject to some
regulations, expressed either in the convention itself or in another treaty,
no regulations may be applied to warships; they are immune from other
than flag jurisdiction. Article 8 states that they "have complete immunity
21See generally, M. McDoVGAL & W. BuRKE, PuBLOc ORDER oF TE OcEANs 751
et seq. (1962); J. COLONMOS, INTERNAIONAL LAw oF THE SEA 64 (6th rev. ed.
1967); for historical background, see P. Porra, THE FRuEEoM OF THE SEAS (1924);
for military implications, see Deddish, The Right of Passage by Warships through Inter-
national Straits, 24 JAG J. 79 (December 1969-January 1970).
G. GmEL, 1 LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE Lk MER 236 (1932); M. Mc-
DouGAL & W. BuaE, supra note 21, at 869 et seq; The S.S. Lotus, [1927] PCIJ ser.
A, No. 10, at 25; The Jessie, The Thomas F. Bayard, and the Pescawha (Great Britain
v. United States), 1 Ann. Dig. 175, Reports: Neilsen's 429 (1926); and see The Le
Louis, [1817] 2 Dodson, [1853] Eng. Adm. R. 210.
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from jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State." Hence, freedom
of navigation for warships may be deemed to be the most comprehensive
of the protected uses of the high seas. The "high seas" are defined in
Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas as "all parts of the sea
that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
state." Given the historic uses of the ocean, "all parts" has both a vertical
and horizontal extension.
Whatever the vertical definition of high seas, the term "freedom of
navigation" appears only to be used with regard to the high seas. Navi-
gation through territorial waters in the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone of 1958 is characterized in Article 14 as "inno-
cent passage or "navigation." The words "freedom of navigation" are not
used in this connection. In Article 16(4) of the Territorial Sea Conven-
tion relating to straits all of whose waters are territorial at some point, the
reference is to "innocent passage" and not "freedom of navigation": "There
shall be .no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through
straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the
high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a
foreign State." The International Court of Justice used similar language
in the Corfu Channel judgment..23 Insofar as a body of water connecting
two parts of the high seas or the high seas and the territorial waters of a
state was less than 6 miles in breadth, no special straits regime in favor
of users existed. The waters were territorial and the principle of innocent
passage applied with the ambiguous proviso that passage not be sus-
pended so long as it was innocent.
On the high seas, "freedom of navigation" includes the right of sub-
merged movement of submarines. However, this freedom does not extend
under existing treaties to the "innocent passage" rights of foreign ships
through territorial waters in general or through territorial waters in straits.
Article 14(6) of the Territorial Sea Convention states: "Submarines are re-
quired to navigate on the surface and to show their flag." Hence a strict
interpretation, in line with the principles of construction of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, -2 4 would induce the interpreter to con-
clude that "freedom of navigation" has not included freedom of submerged
transit through territorial waters in straits, under treaties now in force, a
point of some importance insofar as ambiguities in proposed texts are to
be clarified in the light of the lex lata. More generally, the principles of
innocent passage rather than freedom of navigation govern transit by any
foreign vessel through territorial waters. In this respect the key differ-
ence 'between freedom of navigation and innocent passage is competence.
In freedom of navigation, competence about the character of the user is
the flag state's; in innocent passage it is the coastal state's. As for the
cavil that an international tribunal will vindicate the user, it is plain fan-
tasy. If there is an international tribunal, how does one compel the coastal
state to appear there? In the unlikely event that it should appear, how
23 [1949] ICJ REP. 4, 29.
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can one expect the tribunal to apply norms of such exquisite vagueness
in ways favorable to the user?
As long as the major maritime powers insisted on a 3-mile territorial sea,
a belt of international waters between some of the more strategically criti-
cal straits was maintained.2s Merchantmen as well as warships benefited
from passage rights which became increasingly more protected in inter-
national law from the late 19th century on. UNCLOS has, however, pro-
duced a new regime. Article 3 of the Informal Composite Negotiating
Text (ICNT) provides: "Every State has the right to establish the breadth
of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured
from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention." The
rather alarming tendency, enunciated most authoritatively by the Inter-
national Court in the Iceland Fisheries case,-" to view select provisions in
international drafts as indicators of consensus and hence evidence of inno-
vative customary law, despite their failure to win the formal support neces-
sary for adoption in conformity with constitutive processes, virtually trans-
forms Article 3 into custom. The prophecy becomes self-fulfilling when
many states, acting on the purported authority of draft Article 3, proceed to
exercise their putative right, thereby providing the evidence of state prac-
tice that confirms the consolidation of the custom.2 7  Factors such as
quantitative simplicity make provisions on the order of Article 3 more
likely candidates for accelerated customization than more complex provi-
sions which, in the dynamics of conference bargaining, may have been
parts of packages or trades for support in return for inclusion of Article 3
in the draft." , Be that as it may, the continuing erosion of the U.S. com-
mitment to a 3-mile limit means that formerly high seas belts for passage
through critical straits may become territorial waters. With a 12-mile
territorial sea available to coastal states on demand, as many as 116 straits
that currently include a high seas belt and hence are open to passage under
the "freedom of navigation" may lawfully be territorialized and henceforth,
in the absence of a special and clearly prescribed regime, available to
ships only under the much more limited right of innocent passage. Only
some of those straits may be currently vital, but a draft long-term treaty
must be weighed against long-term interests, under which straits of only
2' For discussion of the waxing and then waning of the 3-mile rule, see S. SwARZ-
TRAUBER, THE THREE-MILE Litrr or TERRITORIAL SEAS (1972).
2-. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Judgment), [1974] ICJ REP. 3, 26.
27 See, in this regard, Arbitration between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the French Republic on the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf, Decision of 30 June 1977, HMSO Cmnd. 7438, Misc. No. 15 (1978), reprinted
in 18 ILM 397 (1979); and see especially the concurring opinion of Judge Briggs at
120 (ILM at p. 457).
28 "It no longer seems to be seriously doubted that a 12-mile territorial sea has been
established by customary international law, or soon will be unless a trend develops
toward even wider limits." Burke, Submerged Passage, supra note 20, at 194 n.6.
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marginal utility now may acquire the greatest and most urgent importance.
Does the doctrine of "innocent passage" in its 1958 form or in its UNCLOS
transformation meet the security requirements of the United States? 29
II. icGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE
Articles 14 to 17 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone deal with "the right of innocent passage." " The com-
parable provisions in the ICNT are Articles 17 to 26. Both references
are to surface passage and not to overflight. In both texts, there is sub-
stantial congruence with regard to the referents of passage, but marked
differences with regard to the meaning of "innocence."a1 Article 14(4) of
the 1958 text states: "Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage
shall take place in conformity with these articles and with other rules of
international law." For our purposes, it is the first sentence of Article
14(4), dealing with the notion of innocence, which is important; the
29 One of the more alarming aspects of the straits debate has been the identification
of those straits that are currently indispensable as the maximum number of straits
likely to be indispensable in the future. Pirtle, for example, writes that "[a]lthough
all straits serve the same 'navigation function, straits unrelated to 'lifelines' or military
objectives can be factored out of the national security equation." Supra note 10, at
487. This type of extrapolation represents the most primitive form of policy analysis
and should be eschewed. The relative importance of different avenues of the oceans
in the future will depend on technics, contexts, and needs which cannot be envisaged
now. It should be clear that the prudent course is not to surrender any of these
maritime highways if it can be avoided. Where they must be sacrificed, it is foolish
to persuade ourselves of their triviality, since it induces us to concede them for less
and less. For a persuasive statement, see Grandison & Myer, International Straits,
Global Communications and The Evolving Law of the Sea, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
393, 414-15 (1975). But see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE GEoClAPItM,
MAps RELATING TO THE LAw OF THE SEA, No. 6, World Straits Affected by a Twelve-
Mile Territorial Sea. See also Knight, The 1971 United States Proposals on the Breadth
of the Territorial Sea and Passage Through International Straits, 51 OnE L. REv. 759,
772 (1972).
30 On innocent passage in general, see M. McDOUGAL & W. BunKE, ,:upra note 21,
at 174 et seq; J. CoLOMBos, supra note 21, at 132-35. See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
oND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §45; Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the Inter-
national Court of justice: General Principles and Substantive Law, 527 BraT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1, 28-29 (1950); Deddish, supra note 21. On Soviet theories, see W. E.
BuTLER, Soviet Concepts of Innocent Passage, 7 HARv. INT'L L.J. 113, and THE SoVIET
UNION AND Tm LAw OF THE SEA 51-70 (1971). See also Przetacznik, Freedom of
Navigation Through Territorial Sea and International Straits, 55 REv. Dnorr INT'L
SCIENCES DPLOMATIQUES & PorinQuEs 222, 299 (1977). Some useful though dated
discussion of the customary right of innocent passage and its relevance to nonsigna-
tories of the 1958 convention may be found in Donat-Pharand, Innocent Passage in
the Arctic, 6 CAN. Y.B. IN'L L. 3 (1968).
31 There is, unfortunately, no concise term to denote a passage that is "not inno-
cent." "Noxious" passage seems too strong in connotation, especially in the light of
the criteria proposed by the ICNT, The interest in precision would appear to out-
weigh the interest in elegance. I will use the term "noninnocent" passage to desig-
nate passage that fails one of the tests of the 1958 convention or the IGNT.
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second sentence would appear to refer to the more technical aspects of
passage. Article 19(1) of the ICNT replicates the first part of the 1958
provision but then illuminates it in paragraph 2:
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal State, if in the territorial
sea it engages in any of the following activities:
(a) Any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorlial
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other
manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) Any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of
the defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or se-
curity of the coastal State;
(e) The launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) The launching, landing or taking on board of any military
device;
(g) The embarking or disembarking of any commodity, currency or
person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regula-
tions of the coastal State;
(h) Any act of wilful and serious pollution, contrary to this Con-
vention;
(i Any fishing activities;
The carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k Any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communica-
tion or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(1) Any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
The intention may have been no more than to illuminate Article 14,
but the change in language here is substantive in result. Article 14 of the
1958 convention permitted the coastal state to characterize passage as non-
innocent if it was, in its view, "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security
of the coastal state." This formula requires the coastal state to demon-
strate that effects deriving from the projected passage will be prejudicial
to the coastal state itself. The category of effects may have been too am-
biguous and open-ended for the prudent international user and could have
been made "more precise and less susceptible to the discretionary appre-
ciation of the coastal state," .2 but it was, at least, limited to effects on the
coastal state. In contrast, the ICNT, introducing the Charter formula,
both severs the link to effects on the coastal state and extends the range
of effects of a projected passage that the coastal state may take account
of in assessing the purported innocence of a passage. Possible effects on
other states may apparently be taken into account, if they are illicit under
the Charter. Article 51 of the Charter states: "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
fense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary.... ." Many schol-
ars consider the Charter's post hoc requirement for activation of the right
32 Burke, Contemporary Law of the Sea, supra note 14, at 11.
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of self-defense quite obsolete and contend that the Charter must now be
interpreted to permit an anticipatory self-defense. If that interpretation
is accepted, the discretionary judgment given the coastal state under
ICNT Article 19 is even broader than would appear on its face. Pro-
fessor Burke remarks pertinently:
It is one thing to base this judgment only on the activities of par-
ticular ship [sic] in transit (even in light of the general context of
contemporary relations between the coastal state and others) and
quite another to reach conclusions derived from a much broader state
of affairs such as the nature of the cargo aboard, its ports of call,
destination, previous history in transit, and so forth. To permit coastal
officials to take into account the latter range of factors, and to link
them with prevailing political relations with or between other states,
broadens coastal discretion very considerably and extends it to sub-
stantial license. Concern for the broad community interest (including
the coastal interest as a flag state in other contexts) justifies establish-
ing limits on coastal discretion by providing that the innocence, or
lack thereof, of passage must be determined only by specific acts
occurring during passage in the territorial sea itself.33
The ICNT formula is not limited to principles expressed in the Charter;
it refers to principles of international law "embodied" in the Charter ("in-
corpor" in the French version, "Incorporado" in the Spanish). Whatever
"embodied" means, it would not appear to require an explicit provision.
Hence, it will be for the coastal state initially, and often primarily and
effectively, to determine whether a principle of international law it alleges
is "embodied" in the Charter.
Consider also the second part of paragraph 2(a). If the intention of
the drafters was to limit the discretion of the coastal state by adding a
qualification to the permissible impacts of the transiting ship on the sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of the coastal
state,34 then it may have failed. Syntactically, the second part of Article
19(2) (a) can be read as qualifying "threat or use of force." Consequently,
the text may authorize the coastal state to characterize as noninnocent,
and hence suspendable passage, activities in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, which
are not necessarily a threat or use of force against the sovereignty, ter-
ritorial integrity, or political independence of the coastal state. The im-
pression of the French text is even more spacious, requiring that ships
and planes "s'abstiennent .. .de toute autre action en violation des prin-
cipes du droit international."
Some proponents of the draft contend that a practical restraint on the
discretion of the coastal state may be derived from the words, "in the ter-
331d. at 12.
3 This assumption, which would predispose the interpreter to construe restrictively
coastal state competences to limit innocent passage, would appear to he unwarranted
if the innocent passage provisions of the ICNT are compared with those of the 1958
convention. ICNT Article 19 introduces so many new limitations on irnocent passage
that the counter-assumption that the test intends to increase coastal state competence
would appear to be the better working hypothesis.
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ritorial sea." In other words, they argue, the discretion of the coastal state
to characterize a passage as noninnocent requires that the threat of viola-
tion of international law occur while the ship is in passage. There is, in
short, an alleged locational requirement. But the requirement is an in-
effective limitation on coastal state discretion for two reasons. First, inno-
cence is no longer causally related to impacts on the coastal state. Second,
in the environment of modem technology, the symbolic or 'flag-showing"
functions of surface vessels cannot be suspended during strait transit or
become operative only when the ships have assumed their stations; the
symbolic function commences the moment that course changes are noted
and increases in intensity as the ships continue on the new course. Con-
sider a scenario of a war in the Middle East: As a symbol of U.S. com-
mitment and a signal of deterrence, the President orders ships in the North
Atlantic to make for the eastern Mediterranean and ships in the Pacific
to make for the Arabian Sea. The moment Soviet satellites note the new
course, the communication of intention has been made; it is increased in
intensity as the ships remain on course and move closer to the designated
theater. If a state believes that the U.S. action is an unlawful interven-
tion, in violation of international law, will it deem that communication
temporarily suspended as the ships move through straits and/or territorial
waters?
In belligerent situations, a state cannot be expected to tolerate enemy
activity in its coastal waters. Both the 1958 and 1977 versions recognize
a self-defense exception with regard to the passage of vessels of other states
in innocent passage and through straits. But the 1977 conception of in-
nocent passage goes further, for it may authorize the coastal state to
characterize proposed passage by maritime users as noninnocent if the
passage is related to activities in violation of international law and the
Charter, even though those activities do not threaten the coastal state
to the extent of activating a right of self-defense. In this respect the
1977 version transforms the UN Charter and the general reference to
international law into a type of neutrality law to be specified by the coastal
state on a case-by-case basis. It is an interesting idea, to be sure, but
one that has been rejected in the past. In the S.S. Wimbledon,-5 for ex-
ample, Germany sought to suspend French transit rights in the Kiel Canal,
not for reasons of self-defense but on grounds of neutrality. The Perma-
nent Court of International Justice rejected the claim, essentially for con-
ventional law reasons, and then enunciated a more general principle:
... [WIhen an artificial waterway connecting two open seas has been
permanently dedicated to the use of the whole world, such waterway
is assimilated to natural straits in the sense that even the passage of
a belligerent man-of-war does not compromise the neutrality of the
sovereign State under whose jurisdiction the waters in question lie.
36
* "Judgment No. 1 (Merits), [1923] PCIJ ser. A, No. 1.
3r Id. at 28.
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Presumably, the dictum would apply equally to a coastal state's inclination
to prohibit passage, lest it contribute otherwise to a violation of interna-
tional law. The obligations of third states in such matters have probably
been extended in the International Court's Namibia opinion.3" The Wim-
bledon subordinates such obligations to rights of user in international
waterways. The ICNT, in turn, may be viewed as a legisktive overrul-
ing of the Wimbledon principle, both for straits passage and for innocent
passage. Given the absence of centralized international decision in se-
curity matters such as these, the net result could be a significant extension
of coastal state jurisdiction over the characterization of the innocence of
a proposed passage.
It is not difficult to imagine situations in which these new doctrines may
operate to the detriment of U.S.-perceived security interests. Wimbledon-
type situations are quite likely to occur, when the U.S. function in a for-
eign conflict is to provide an ally with food, oil, or materiel, all of which,
under doctrines of modem warfare, can be considered vital to the prosecu-
tion of the belligerency.
38
Even symbolic participation may be circumscribed. In January 1979,
the United States elected to send a force of jet fighters to visit Saudi
Arabia. Ostensible purposes included affirming support for the Saudi
Government, emphasizing U.S. concern to the Soviet Union, and communi-
cating, by deed, messages to multiple audiences in Iran. It was, in short,
a type of "showing the flag" operation, using the medium of planes rather
than ships; indeed, the prospect of sending an aircraft carrier from the
South China Sea, the more conventional modality of communication, had
been considered and then rejected. Spain refused to allow the jets to
refuel in U.S. bases in Spanish territory.39 Though its action was appar-
ently based on treaty interpretation,40 it is clear that Spain could have made
a not implausible argument in terms of Article 2 of the United Nations
Charter with regard to use of airspace superjacent to land territory and
waters. That argument can be made with much greater ease with regard
to innocent passage than to freedom of navigation. The remarks of Pirtle
with regard to straits apply with equal force to innocent passage: "The
implications of discretionary power to determine subjectively the inno-
cence of passage through straits and to unilaterally determine limitations
on such passage are far-reaching." 41
The point is not that Charter principles should not be more widely ap-
plied; they should. But an aspect of determining the utility of a norm and,
37 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
[1970] ICJ RFa. 16, 55 et seq.
88 On this, see Grandison & Meyer, supra note 29, at 419.
39 Burt, Madrid Bans Refueling for F-15's on Visit to Saudis, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13,
1979, §1, at 3 (city ed.).
4OArt. VIII (2), Agreement in Implementation of Chapter VIII of the Agreement
of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain, August 6, 1970,
21 UST 2259, TIAS No. 6977.
4'Firtle, supra note 10, at 481.
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in particular, fixing its level of generality or specificity, is the decision
structure that will be applying it. Many Charter principles were designed
to be applied by UN organs in accord with Charter procedures; the level
of generality and accordingly the amount of discretion passed on to the
applier took this into account. As a general jurisprudential matter, an
open-textured normative formulation in a decision process appropriately
structured to the situation may be desirable because it gives discretion to
the applier; the same formula may be undesirable and invite abuse if the
application is unilateral. When norms whose application threatens severe
deprivations to others are to be applied unilaterally, prudence requires that
these norms be framed at lower levels of generality, lest the application
itself threaten public order. As Burke remarked of the alternative, "The
substitution of a wholly decentralized authority, fragmented amongst over
100 coastal nations, does not represent an improvement, and could lead
to serious impediments to continued efficiency in transport of commodities
around the globe." 42
Obviously, "innocent passage," under its most generous interpretation,
is a much narrower doctrine than "freedom of navigation." Freedom of
navigation is navigation on the high seas. It requires no characterization,
for it self-actualizes; it is what is done. Innocent passage, however, re-
quires the coastal state to characterize the passage as appropriately inno-
cent. Only when it has affirmatively done so is the passage insulated from
lawful suspension by the coastal state. Moreover, the 1958 convention
imposes the regime of innocent passage of ships through straits whose
waters are territorialized (Article 16(4)), and a submarine's would-be
innocence, both under the 1958 and 1977 texts, requires it to surface and
to show its flag. In short, a transposition of these parts of the 1958 regime
to a context in which territorial seas may be extended to 12 miles, terri-
torializing heretofore international waters in the straits, would not appear
to meet the security requirements of the United States or the Soviet Union.
Since the conception of innocent passage in the ICNT is even more laden
with conditions whose fulfillment must be judged by the coastal state, the
emerging trend in this area of the law must be viewed, from a national
security perspective, as increasingly melancholy.
III. STRArrs
The ICNT establishes two categories of straits. The first, set out in
Article 37 and illuminated and qualified in Article 38, includes straits
"used for international navigation between one area of the high seas or
an exclusive economic zone and another area of the high seas or an exclu-
sive economic zone." For these straits, the neologistic "right of transit
passage" avails; we will consider it in detail below. The second category,
set out in Article 45, includes two types of straits: those straits linking high
seas or exclusive economic zones with waters subject to national jurisdic-
1- Burke, Contemporary Law of the Sea, supra note 14, at 38. But compare his
curious reversal in Submerged Passage, note 20 supra, at 209-10.
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tion and those straits not included in ICNT Article 38. For Article 45
straits, only the more restricted right of innocent passage avails.
Article 38 straits and Article 45 straits are not mutually exclusive cate-
gories. There is, if one may be permitted to use the metaphor, an under-
tow running toward Article 45, for two reasons: the structure of Article
38 and the impact of Article 3 of the LOS draft.
Like its predecessor in the 1958 convention, Article 38's definition mixes
geographical and use factors. In order for a part of the maritime environ-
ment to be characterized as a strait under Article 38 and hence entitled
to the somewhat more extended rights of passage than those afforded by
innocent passage, it must fulfill two cumulative requirements. It must be
a bridge between high seas and/or exclusive economic zones. and it must
in fact be "used for international navigation." ICNT Article 36 further
subjects the geographical component to a special requirement when the
strait is formed by an island of the strait state; then there must be no
"high seas route or a route through an exclusive economic zone of similar
convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical character-
istics." Though the category is limited, this is a qualification whose poten-
tial for future constriction is great. It does not permit would-be users to
invoke political convenience or necessity as a justification for using such a
strait, despite the fact that a high seas or exclusive economic zone route
manifests similar navigational and hydrographical characteristics.
From its inception, the use criterion has been unclear. Can the use
requirement be fulfilled by the potential utility of a strait for international
navigation without regard to the intensity of use, as the International
Court suggested in the Corfu Channel case,43 or is some level of use ac-
tually required to fulfill this condition? The words "used for' in both the
1958 and 1977 versions would suggest a legislative overruling of the Corfu
judgment. If that is the case, then future decision may establish some
threshold of use higher than episodic transit in order for straits to retain
their Article 37 character. The result may well be that many "international
straits" will be transformed into the second category envisaged under
Article 45(1), and users thereafter will not fall under transit passage but
will be required to fulfill the even more stringent requirements of "inno-
cent passage." This aspect of the formulation of the ICNT must be viewed
as unfortunate from the standpoint of world order, for it is the sort of
ambiguity that is likely to excite mischief.44
43 [1949] ICJ REP. 4.
44 Geography outweighs use in this formula. Ironically, a tribunal could not com-
pute the quantum of use of a strait which might have been intended to fulfill the use
requirement so that it could internationalize the strait. Compare The Case of the
Edisto and Eastwind, 57 DEP'T STATE BULL. 362 (1967); Pharand, Soviet Union Warns
United States Against Use of Northeast Passage, 62 AJIL 927 (1968). The contro-
versy, by no means settled, of the "innocence" of warships for passage purposes, will
thus be transferred to many straits situations. See, in this regard, Przetacznik, supra
note 30, at 302-15.
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Article 45 will absorb other straits because of the flow of territorial
waters seaward. Prior to the UNCLOS policy allowing extension of terri-
torial waters to 12 miles' breadth, any body of water beyond a strait which
body was more than 6 miles wide contained, perforce, a water and air
column whose breadth was equivalent to the surplus over those 6 miles,
and that water and air column was legally international, rendering the
strait "international" in the sense in which Article 38 of the ICNT uses
the term. Subsequent to ICNT Article 3, however, the body of water in
the strait must be more than 24 miles wide in order to allow for a column
of "international waters." The result is that more of the geographical
straits of the world become legal straits for which passage must qualify
under Article 38 and Article 45. A side benefit, however, is that now even
straits less than 6 miles in width may qualify, ceteris paribus, for transit
passage.
I do not propose to inquire whether straits currently falling in the Article
45 category are deemed vital for U.S. security. UNCLOS is creating a
long-term treaty and in the course of its life, conceptions of security and
security needs may be expected to change many times.45 I take it as given
that, over the long haul, some and perhaps many of the straits in this
category will become vital. The regime the ICNT provides for straits in
the categories established by Article 45 would appear to be insufficient
for the security needs of the United States. The passage must be prospec-
tively "innocent," as determined by the coastal state; even if it fulfills the
many conditions of innocence, submarines will still be required to effect
their passage on the surface. Hence, even if the ICNT regime for straits
governed by Article 38 were satisfactory from a security standpoint, the
number of international straits falling under Article 45 as well as the
"undertow" toward that provision would still stir substantial doubt about
the acceptability of the ICNT in this regard.
IV. TRANsrr PASSAGE
The ICNT's regime for straits governed by Article 38 poses its own dis-
turbing questions. Article 38 of the ICNT provides:
1. In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy
the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded, except that,
if the strait is formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and
its mainland, transit passage shall not apply if a high seas route or a
route in an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with re-
spect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics exists seaward
of the island.
2. Transit passage is the exercise in accordance with this Part of
the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of con-
tinuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one area of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another area of the high
seas or an exclusive economic zone. However, the requirement of
continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through
45 See, in this regard, the pertinent remarks of Knight, supra note 29., at 772.
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the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a
State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that
State.
3. Any activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit
passage through a strait remains subject to the other applicable pro-
visions of this Convention.
Earlier drafts submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union may
provide a foil. In 1971, the United States proposed the following provision
for straits:
In straits used for international navigation betveen one part of the
high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of
a foreign State, all ships and aircraft in transit shall enjoy the same
freedom of navigation and overflight, for the purpose of transit through
and over such straits, as they have on the high seas. Coastal States
may designate corridors suitable for transit by all ships and aircraft
through and over such straits. In the case of straits where particular
channels of navigation are customarily employed by ships in transit,
the corridors, so far as ships are concerned, shall include such
channels. 46
An early Soviet draft provided that "[n]o State shall be entitled to inter-
rupt or suspend the transit of ships through straits, or engage therein in
any acts which interfere with the transit of ships, or require ships in transit
to stop or communicate information of any kind." 47 There are some strik-
ing additions, deletions, and arrangements in the ICNT product, in par-
ticular, the introduction of the concept of "transit passage."
"Transit passage" is a neologism; it lies somewhere between "freedom of
navigation" on the one hand, and "innocent passage" on the other. It is
a compromise, a concession or a second-best solution 4 8 when contrasted
4665 DEP'T STATE BULL. 266 (1971). Thus, John Stevenson in a statement to Sub-
committee II of the Seabed Committee, July 28, 1972: "The United States and others
have also made it clear that their vital interests require that agreement on twelve mile
territorial sea be coupled with agreement on free transit of straits used for international
navigation and these remain basic elements of our national policy which we will not
sacrifice." Supra note 4.
For an early review, see Ratiner, United States Ocean Policy: An Analysis, 2 J.
MAR. L. & CoM. 225, 263-64 (1971); Knight, supra note 29, at 773. See also Cun-
dick, International Straits: The Right of Access, 5 GA. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 107 (1975).
Five years after the 1971 proposal, an official explained U.S. objectives as follows:
"... what we seek is freedom of navigation (i.e., submerged transit) and overflight
for the purpose of transit in straits connecting high seas to high seas. We oppose the
restrictions of innocent passage in such straits .. " Letter of Stuart French, U.S. De-
partment of Defense, to Senator John C. Stennis (Aug. 11, 1976), quoted in Burke,
Submerged Passage, supra note 20, at 218-19.
47UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.10 (1973), at 189-90, Art. 2(e).
48 Much has been made of the coastal state's interest in having submarines pass on
the surface through straits. While concern for navigation and for rules of the road
may be valid, there would appear to be no increment of coastal security in having
submarines surface when proximate to the coastal state. Indeed, these arguments
seem -to be based on a misperception of the distinctive nature of the submarine's
function and a confusion of the submarine with surface vessels. Even if the trans-
iting submarine were targeting sites within the coastal state, it would not have to
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with the earlier maritime power drafts. The key question is whether, on
its face or as construed by international law's methods of interpretation,
the new doctrine of transit passage gives rights, in a quantity and with
certainty sufficient to make the regime acceptable from a security stand-
point. Some commentators are convinced that it does. Pirtle, for ex-
ample, writes that "[tihe ICNT provisions on transit passage and archi-
pelagic sea-lanes passage constitute a treaty weighted in favor of the
navigation and security interests of the United States ."49 U.S. negotiators
apparently agree and believe that transit passage is very, very close to
the freedom of navigation available on the high seas and, moreover, that
the text provides a right of submerged passage by submarines which would
unquestionably be deemed to be an exercise of the freedom of navigation.50
In support of this interpretation one may note that the ICNT's definition
of "transit passage" does, indeed, include a reference to the "freedom of
navigation" and does not include a requirement of surface passage by sub-
marines. Furthermore, insertion of "transit passage" seems to exclude
"innocent passage." But the text is not explicit and an interpretation based
ultimately on an intersection of inclusio and exclusio is not the sort of
case a lawyer happily sends to trial.
The more optimistic interpretation of Article 38 encounters a number of
obstacles. When a legal document speaks of duties, it may be presumed to
mean legal duties and not moral or ethical duties whose content or com-
pliance depends only upon the duty-bound party. The correlative of a
duty is a right. Though Article 39 speaks of user duties, it necessarily
imports coastal rights. It must be construed as allowing the coastal states
a broad prescriptive and applicative competence with regard to transit
passage unless we are to assume that the "duties" are no more than moral
imprecations. There is no correlative here to Article 236, the sovereign im-
munity clause, with regard to coastal regulations under Article 42. Of
most concern are some of the duties imposed on users by the relevant
terms of Article 39(1):
1. Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage
shall:
(a) Proceed without delay through or over the strait;
(b) Refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering
approach the state, since the range of its missiles would permit it to stand off beyond
territorial or straits waters. As for showing the flag, that traditional naval function
can only be accomplished when the sub has surfaced. The likelihood that the sub-
marine will become a target for nuclear or conventional attack and set off, theoreti-
cally, secondary nuclear explosions or radiation contamination increases with increased
visibility to adversaries. From a security standpoint, the coastal state's safety increases
the less others know of the transiting submarine's whereabouts. It is thus more likely
that the coastal state's demand for surface transit is based either on misunderstanding
of the situation or the desire to increase its competence in order to augment power
vis-i-vis the transiting state.
49 Pirtle, supra note 10, at 486.
0.o Letter from Senator Barry Goldwater to the author, July 23, 1976.
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straits, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of inter-
national law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(c) Refrain from any activities other than those incident to their
normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered
necessary by force majeure or by distress;
(d) Comply with other relevant provisions of this Part.
In order for passage to be "transit passage," it must be effected without
delay, not be a "threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of States bordering straits" (note the
plural usage here), and not "in any other manner in violation of the prin-
ciples of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."
Because these are legal duties and hence require characteristics that the
coastal state must assess, "transit passage" takes on many of the features
of innocent passage. In comparison, high seas "freedom of navigation"
has virtually no limitations or qualifications other than the duty of reason-
ableness which attends virtually every right. And insofar as international
norms do apply, the danger of provocative unilateral application is mini-
mized by other norms and by the spatial context.
Since the major differences between innnocent passage and freedom of
navigation are the conditions and right of qualification of the coastal state
with regard to the former, "transit passage" seems more a species of inno-
cent passage than a high seas freedom. Though ICNT Article 44 does
conclude that "[t]here shall be no suspension of transit passage," that is
not the same as saying "[t]here shall be no suspension of passage." In
other words, a state bordering a strait might unilaterally determine that
a particular transit, in given circumstances, violates ICNT Article 39(1)(b),
hence is not a "transit passage" in the meaning of the convention and may
either be prohibited entirely or permitted only upon the fulfillment of con-
ditions imposed by the coastal state, for example, upon surfacing.
Moreover, transit passage, as defined in ICNT Articles 37 to 39, requires
characteristics that are incompatible with the high seas noticn of freedom
of navigation. In particular, the word "solely" in Article 38(2), the broad
right of characterization necessarily given to the coastal state in Article
39(1)(b), and the ambiguous scope of Article 39(1)(d) add conditions
that never burdened "freedom of navigation." Though not without am-
biguity, Article 41(1) may constitute possible authorization to the strait
state to insist on surface transit of submarines through busy straits as a
safety regulation, particularly when contrasted with Articles 42 and 236.
The equivocality of these provisions would excite no concern were there
an explicit provision stating that submarines may always traverse inter-
national straits submerged.
The net result of the ICNT in this regard is that the extension of terri-
torial waters from a 3-mile limit territorializes formerly high seas belts
in strategically critical international straits; in return, the ICNT does not
unequivocally -guarantee a functional equivalent to the virtually uncondi-
tional "freedom of navigation" that other maritime states used to enjoy
in the belt of international waters through international straits. Instead,
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it offers a right of "transit passage," burdened with qualifications unknown
to the "freedom of navigation." The situation could begin to approach
Jared Carter's nightmare of "ten, fifteen, twenty Berlin corridors." 51
V. THE PROBLEM OF SUBMERGED PASSAGE
Even if "transit passage" affords users significantly more rights than
does innocent passage as far as surface passage is concerned, a key ques-
tion for U.S. security is whether "transit rights" permit submarines, while
submerged, to traverse straits. Innocent passage does not accord sub-
marines this right; hence, submarines traversing straits under Article 45
of the ICNT must surface in order for their passage to be deemed innocent.
The section dealing with transit rights does not explicitly require sub-
marines to surface, as does ICNT Article 20 and Article 14(6) of the 1958
convention. It is possible to infer a permission from the absence of a
prohibition, a possibility whose reasonableness is enhanced by the fact
that the parallel innocent passage provisions do contain an express pro-
hibition. It is, alas, equally possible not to infer a permission which is
not explicit, especially when international jurisprudence interprets deroga-
tions from sovereignty strictly and textually. U.S. negotiators have appar-
ently told members of the Senate that Article 39(1)(c) of the ICNT
does accord submarines the right of submerged passage and, perhaps
because of some disquiet about the ambiguity of the text, refer to an
"understanding" on this point. 52 In my view, neither textual interpretation
nor private understanding succeeds in removing clouds from title.
Do the words, "normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit," in
Article 39(1)(c) amount to a nonsuspendable license to traverse straits
submerged? In order to reach this result, "normal mode" must be con-
strued as noncontextual, nonnormative, and permanently vessel-specific.
But in the text and in general, this interpretation is forced and unreal.
Mode of transit of different vessels is, in part, a factual question, but it
also has normative and contextual components, for what is "normal" will
depend on context, including the legal environment. It is neither im-
plausible nor inconsistent with other ICNT provisions to assume that both
the coastal and the flag state will participate in determining "normality"
for vessels transiting coastal waters.
As for the vessels themselves, a layman is not equipped to characterize
the normal mode of transit of submarines but would assume that mode
would vary according to such factors as type of channel, density of traffic,
safety factors, nature of mission, rules of the road, and so on. What may
be "normal" in internal or territorial waters would be "abnormal" on the
high seas, and so on. Knauss, for example, writes that ballistic missile
submarines now run submerged through their entire patrol, including
51 Carter, The Outlook for the Territorial Sea and Navigation through Straits and
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international straits, but notes that "it would certainly be easier and safer
to go through those narrow and busy straits on the surface." It is quite
likely that a modern submarine moves efficiently and safely submerged,
but one could not infer from this datum (which might itself be contro-
verted in some contexts) that submerged passage was "normal" for all
circumstances. 54  Nor would Article 39(1) (c) appear to override the
state's regulatory competence for matters such as navigation and safety.5
In other words, the user would be bard pressed to justify evading such
regulations on grounds that they required departure from its normal mode
of transit
From a textual standpoint, the "normal modes" aspect of ICNT Article
39(1) (c) raises problems not easily resolved, especially in view of the
textual orientation of international treaty construction. The "freedom of
navigation" for passage through straits established in Article 38(2) is not
freedom of navigation in the high seas sense: it is "freedom of navigation
and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit."
That qualification was apparently introduced in order to deny ships tran-
siting straits all the other components of freedom of navigation, such as
overt military exercises and weapons testing, surveillance and intelligence
gathering, and refueling. The purport of the provision is negative, i.e.,
vessels should refrain from activities other than those incident to transit.
The "normal modes" qualification appears in the following context: "Ships
and aircraft while exercising the right of transit passage, shall . . . (c)
[r]efrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal
modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by
force majeure or by distress. .. ." The plain and natural meaning of that
provision would appear to emphasize the notion of expeditious transit. As
two U.S. negotiators commented in 1975, "The 'security' problem with sub-
marine and military aircraft transit of straits is in fact one of limiting the
right to transit to its normal incidents." 56 In other words, you may do
5 Knauss, The Military Role in the Oceans and Its Relations to the Law of the Sea
in LAw OF THE SEA: A NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE 77 (L. Alexander ed. 1972). But
compare Goldblat, Law of the Sea and the Security of Coastal States in LAw OF THE
SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 301 (Christy et al. eds. 1975).
-4Thus Professor Burke, writing in 1975, observed:
Another contention is that safety requires submerged transit. It seems rather
late in the date to urge this seriously in view of the previously wide acceptance
of a requirement for surface transit in the territorial sea, including acceptance by
the major powers operating nuclear submarines. There may be substance to this
point, but concern for safety can be satisfied in other ways more consonant with
coastal interests than simply providing for unannounced submerged passage by
large nuclear-powered vessels carrying nuclear weapons.
Contemporary Law of the Sea, supra note 14, at 12.
55 Burke argues on the basis of textual analysis that "Article 38 does not authorize
the coastal state to determine what is a 'normal' mode of transit each time a vehicle
approaches a strait." Submerged Passage, supra note 20, at 214. That may be so,
but the ICNT would appear to permit the coastal state to determine or participate in
determining "normal mode" for classes of vessels and/or for specific time periods, e.g.,
periods of crisis.
56 Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on The Law of the
Sea, 69 AJIL 1, 15 (1975).
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things normally associated with modes of continuous and expeditious tran-
sit, even though such activities would otherwise be forbidden in transit
passage. Sonar, for example, may yield information of intelligence value,
and one of the ancillary functions of the use of sonar on the high seas may
be the intelligence dividend. 7 Even though you may not gather intelligence
in transit passage, you need not suspend sonar when you transit straits
if you ordinarily use sonar in your continuous and expeditious transit.
Thus, the simplest or most natural interpretation of Article 39(1)(c) is
one that does not focus on normal mode, whatever that may be, but rather
on the activities ancillary to transit, which, absent this provision, would
be prohibited by Article 38.
Alternative interpretations of Article 39 encounter other problems.
There are, for example, internal contradictions if Article 39(1)(c) is read
to permit submerged transit of straits. The subsection immediately pre-
ceding subparagraph (c) recognizes the coastal state's competence to ap-
praise the contemplated passage, inter alia, for its conformity to the prin-
ciples of international law embodied in the UN Charter. If submerged
passage is secret passage, then how can the coastal state perform that func-
tion under subsection (b)? How can it control unauthorized research and
survey activities which may be undertaken by the submerged vessel under
Article 40? How can it implement its safety and sea lanes regulations
(Articles 41 and 42), and so on? If anything, the structure of the en-
tire section dealing with transit passage emerges as a more coherent draft-
ing complex if no right of submerged passage is hypothesized.
The provisions regarding innocent passage, including the requirement
that submarines traverse territorial waters on the surface, appear in part II
of the ICNT, while the issue of transit passage occurs in part III. Could
an authoritative interpreter infer from this an implied bar of the rules of
innocent passage to all of part III? Such a construction seems forced and,
for such a grave matter, unsatisfactory. It is far more reasonable to assume
that provisions will be interpreted by reference to the entire instrument,
a point confirmed by the Vienna Convention -9 and the recent Beagle
57One would, in this regard, take exception to Professor O'Connell's view that free
transit would permit one
to go through using your sonar, with helicopters engaged in dunking sonar opera-
tions, with missiles unhoused, etc., etc., and doing a zig-zag pattern and the like,
all of which one would assume you could do in the high seas but not in the
territorial seas engaged in innocent passage.
BrtrrAxN AND THE SEA (Papers and Records of a Conference at the Royal Naval College,
Greenwich, 1973), cited in Young, supra note 4. To the contrary, it would appear
that the words "normal mode," reasonably construed, would limit many of the opera-
tions in Professor O'Connell's reductio. Compare Knight, supra note 29, at 773,
especially the reference to "on-board activities."
5 Despite Professor Burke's assertion (Submerged Passage, supra note 20, at 208),
it is difficult to see how the qualifications of ICNT Articles 38 and 39 could be as easily
fulfilled by a submarine as a surface vessel. With regard to Article 38(1)(c), for
example, how can one tell if a passing submerged vessel is or is not preparing to
cause injury?
-:'Article 31(2)(a), UN Doe. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), DocuMENTs OF THE CON-
FERENCE, supra note 19, at 287, 293.
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Channel arbitration.60 In any case, part III does make incorporations by
reference to the rules of innocent passage, for example in Article 45, and
refers generally to other provisions in Article 38(3).
The presence of conditions whose fulfillment must be certified by the
host state in order for passage to be innocent and hence nonsuspendable
would probably lead an international tribunal, were it seized of the case,
to conclude that passage is not a right at all, but a type of license. This
is not the place to enter into extensive discussion of international servi-
tudes,61 but it is worth recalling the International Court's judgment in the
Right of Passage case.62 There the Court distinguished between passage
not subject to conditions by the host a virtual servitude whose suspension
by the host would be delictual, and passage subject to conditions, for
which suspension by the host could be lawful. It is apparent with regard
to straits that nothing akin to a servitude is being created in the ICNT.
Hence, anticipation of extensive construction of the rights granted would
appear unwarranted.
Allegations by U.S. negotiators to members of the Senate cf an "under-
standing" on the right of submerged passage through straits are puzzling.,"
Go CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE BEAGLE CHANNEL REGION [Chile v. Argentina]
(Santiago 1977).
61 See generally North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration (United States v. Creat
Britain), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 141 (Penn. Ct. Arb. 1913), PERMANENT CoUnR OF
ARBITRATION, NORTH ATLA.,TC COAST FIsHEIES ARBITRATION, Vols. 1-12 (Wash-
ington: GPO, 1913); S.S. Wimbledon, [1923] PCIJ ser. A, No. 1; Rights of Passage,
[1960] ICJ REP. 6; for a survey of the literature, see D. O'CONNELL, 2 INTERNATIONAL
LAW 602 et seq. (2d ed. 1970).
62 [19601 ICJ REP. 6.
63 Goldwater letter, supra note 50. Professor Burke develops another conception
of "understanding." He sifts "comments, questions and proposals" about submerged
passage and finds that these confirm, in his judgment, an understanding shared by par-
ticipants that submarines would have a right of submerged transit through straits.
Submerged Passage, supra note 20, at 205. There are many serious problems with
this approach. The first, as mentioned, is that there is no record to sperk of, but only
fragments; bow probative such a record would be is open to grave question. The
second is that many of the statements that are available can be disqualified for interest.
The fact that the United States, for example, continued to insist on its understanding
of an equivocal text (see id. at 206) neither banishes the obvious equivocality of the
text nor proves that others accepted the interpretation pressed by the United States.
It simply proves that the text is equivocal and that the United States, unable to secure
a text that clearly expressed its interest, had no choice but to say petulantly, "Well,
this is what we mean." Alas, the objective in this game is not to make statements, off
the board, but to win the text that you need. Third, the acquiescence by others is
derived essentially from the absence of evidence in the "record" that others did not
object. Whatever the chairmen of individual committees may have thought, recent
diplomatic history should demonstrate the peril of this course. In negotiations with the
People's Republic of China over Taiwan, the United States apparently satisfied itself
with an understanding based on its own statement, which was not challenged by
China. At a later stage, China "clarified" its position and the U.S. "understanding"
dissolved. Despite all of the alleged "understanding" he tries to reconstruct, Professor
Burke is still somewhat cautious about conclusions; in a single page, he shifts from an
"unmistakable" right of submerged passage, to "little room for question," and then
"strongly suggests" (id. at 207). The ambivalence is important. The point of the
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If it is a conference-wide understanding that is documented and/or incor-
porated by reference through a general provision, then this is a telling
point. There are, of course, conventional requirements for such an under-
standing. There is a possibility that the Vienna Convention in Article 31
may require that such an agreement be between all the parties or be ac-
cepted by the other parties.
Unfortunately, there is no record of such an understanding and no way
of establishing that all parties to the treaty share or accept this ancillary
agreement. If our negotiators are referring to a suppressed document,
presumably concluded with a much smaller number of states, its power
to counter the plain and natural meaning of the convention would appear
doubtful, to say the least. Whether an agreement that has not been
registered under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter can be invoked
against a multilateral treaty, which presumably will have been, is also
doubtful.
"An oral agreement," Samuel Goldwyn quipped, "isn't worth the paper
it's written on." The idea of an undocumented "understanding" among
all or even most of the more than 150 delegations at the LOS conference
is preposterous, and the lawyer who would believe it, advise reliance on
it, or invoke it before a tribunal would be very naive indeed. If our ne-
gotiators are referring to "secret" understandings with key strait states
about a U.S. right of submerged transit through their straits, then one
can only remark on the peril and shortsightedness of such a course.
64 If
the plain and natural meaning of the ICNT is against these understand-
ings, then they are unlikely to survive changes of government in the strait
states, if that long. Why there should be an understanding on something
so important at a meeting whose manifest function is to articulate norms
on the subject is also puzzling. The asymmetry in our willingness to
accept understandings in matters vital to us but to concede explicit provi-
sions in matters vital to others is more than disquieting.
VI. APPRAISAL AND CONCLUSION
The straits regime of the ICNT poses two problems: the absence of an
express right of submerged passage in a context of other provisions, many
of which could be inconsistent with an allegedly implied right, and, second,
the more general problem, common to the innocent passage regime, of the
present inquiry is not that submerged passage is excluded, but that it is not certain
in the text, and, in the absence of express confirmation, is unlikely to defeat coastal
competences which are explicit and could be used to require surface passage and, in
some circumstances, ban passage and overflight.
64 This hypothetical strategy is reminiscent of Boss Hague's apothegm that an honest
politician is one who stays bought. The notion that bilateral agreements with particular
states are sound strategy for matters of the sort discussed here rests on the assumption
that association of a state with one alliance or another is stable. Recent experience in
Iran, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Vietnam, and China, to mention only a few,
should demonstrate to both superpowers the advantages of a system of real rather
than personal rights, for uses deemed to be of inclusive security concern.
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enhanced primary competence of the coastal state to characterize any
passage below, on, or above the surface as violating "transit" requisites and
hence not "transit passage."
The language of the Camp David agreement of 1978 dealing with straits
passage may be contrasted with that of the UNCLOS text. It is particu-
larly instructive for, though bilateral, it purports to enunciate many general
norms and is the first major diplomatic statement on the subject since the
ICNT draft. Moreover, the United States played a significant role in its
formulation. Rather than adopting or even intimating any relation with
the UNCLOS formula, the Camp David formula states in part: "[T he
Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be
open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navi-
gation and overflight." With this sort of formula, tortured, casuistic
interpretations are not necessary. Indeed, Camp David is redundant in
emphasizing precisely what the ICNT overlooks. The waterways are
characterized as "international" and any hint of a territorial competence
with regard to passage is repeatedly excluded; there is no "right of transit"
characterizable by the coastal state, but instead and only the traditional
freedom of navigation, and that right may not be impeded or suspended.
Interpreted logically or teleologically, Camp David produces freedom of
navigation and, were it necessary, even a right of submerged transit. The
ICNT achieves nothing approaching that clarity.
Empson analyzed seven types of ambiguity in our culture,"" but a wise
old country lawyer was wont to remark that there are only two kinds that
matter: your ambiguities and the other fellow's. It is as unwarranted to
contend that UNCLOS rejects outright the types of straits passage needed
for U.S. security as it is to contend that UNCLOS grants them outright.
The problem is the ambiguity. It would be imprudent to ignore the
erosion in the UNCLOS draft of key aspects of a maritime regime that
will continue to be important to the United States and irresponsible to
deny the transformation of certainties into ambiguities. In the changing
world power process, these may prove to be the other fellow's ambiguities.
Fortunately, there are yet opportunities, at the international and national
levels, for dispelling any possible misunderstandings about the regime of
straits and national security and for assuring a regime that will serve the
common interests of the world community.
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